This article examines the construction, functions and relationship between the diverse and changing articulations of Islamophobia. The aim is to contribute to debates about the definition of Islamophobia, which have tended to be contextually specific, fixed and/or polarized between racism and religious prejudice, between extreme and mainstream, state and non-state versions, or undifferentiated, and offer a more nuanced framework to: (a) delineate articulations of Islamophobia as opposed to precise types and categories; (b) highlight the porosity in the discourse between extreme articulations widely condemned in the mainstream, and normalized and insidious ones, which the former tend to render more acceptable in comparison; (c) map where these intersect in response to events, historical and political conditions and new ideological forces and imperatives; and (d) compare these articulations of Islamophobia in two contexts, France and the United States.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the attack on the office of Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, one could see and hear the statement 'Je suis Charlie' appearing throughout Paris, France and the world. The public narrative was unequivocal: this was an attack on freedom of speech -designated as the cornerstone of democracy and freedom itself. Charlie Hebdo's journalists were proclaimed as martyrs in the struggle for free speech, their courage symbolized in the 2006 publication of provocative cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed. They did what 'We' were afraid to do and mourning their loss seemed insufficient: 'We' must identify if not become them in solidarity and resistance. On the 7th of January and for weeks to come, the streets of Paris and the west, Facebook pages and Tweeter feeds were filled with those calling themselves 'Charlie'. Criticising this essentialist and absolutist vision of understanding fell outside of freedom of speech and was considered something akin to cowardice if not treason, as witnessed in the many headlines about children refusing to obey the minute of silence in French suburbs (Berretta 10 January 2015 , Leconte 14 January 2015 , Beyer and Verduzier 20 January 2015 . This communion around the slogan 'Je suis Charlie', and the self-righteous defence of freedom of speech under the protection of the state, its police and army, hid a multitude of inconsistencies and contradictions. The most notable was the photo opportunity with the leaders of the 'free' and not so free world (and the war on terror) leading (or pretending to lead) the march of solidarity, whose record with regard to freedom of speech and the press was heavily criticized as hypocritical (Sherriff 13 January 2015). Yet, despite such discrepancies at the core of the hegemonic discourse, the overall pattern is familiar: widespread and normalized criticism of an essentialized Muslim threat for its hatred of 'our' liberal freedom and tolerant societies, even as 'our' countries pass -and the population at large chooses to ignore -counter-terrorism and extremism legislation that curtails those very freedoms. This has become common place since US President George W. Bush (20 September 2001) stated in his 9/11 address, prior to the establishment of Homeland Security and the Patriot Act, 'They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other', which became a mantra of the American-led war on terror. Islam has become central to the contradictions inherent to the construction (and presentation) of our identity and self-image as citizens of free and egalitarian liberal democracies: from evocations of free speech in defence of Islamophobes, while monitoring and censoring political speech under the auspices of countering Muslim 'hate' preachers and extremism, to evocations of gender rights in the west, particularly around banning the hijab and burka in the name of emancipation. As such paternalistic narratives developed and disproportionately targeted Muslim communities, they have distracted from failures to achieve gender equality on a structural level, as well as failing to acknowledge the growing anti-feminist backlash within western liberal culture. This article will examine the construction, functions and relationship between the diverse and changing articulations of Islamophobia. The aim of this article is to contribute to debates about the definition of Islamophobia, which have tended to be contextually specific (and sometimes universalized), fixed and/or polarized between racism and religious prejudice, between extreme and mainstream, state and non-state versions, or undifferentiated, and equip those interested in the issue with a more nuanced framework to: (a) clearly delineate articulations of Islamophobia as opposed to precise types and categories; (b) highlight the porosity in the discourse between the more extreme articulations widely condemned in the mainstream, and the more normalized and insidious ones, which the former tend to render more acceptable in comparison; (c) map where these intersect in response to events, historical and political conditions and new ideological forces and imperatives; and (d) compare articulations of Islamophobia in two contexts, France and the United States (US), in order to demonstrate both contextual differences and overlap and the application of our analysis and framework.
The framework developed in this article is built around two main articulations of Islamophobia: an illiberal and a liberal kind. These broad articulations do not work in opposition, as their borders are fuzzy, and that one cannot survive without the other giving it legitimacy. To provide some essential background, the first part of the article provides an overview of definitions of Islamophobia and debates in the field, and explains and justifies our use of the term Islamophobia over alternatives such as anti-Muslim racism. The second and third sections develop the two articulations of Islamophobias we believe are essential to provide a comprehensive picture of the current state of racism towards anyone deemed Muslim.
Throughout the article, examples from France and the United States are provided to illuminate the way in which different articulations of Islamophobia emerge and how it has become increasingly common and in some cases normalized and hegemonic, through the interplay between its liberal and illiberal articulations. These cases provide an excellent opportunity for comparative analysis of elite discourse (media, politicians and academics). Both are secular republics, right-based with a liberal legal and political order and history and significantly both experienced social revolutions in the 1960s and a 'culture war' backlash today, which is key to our analysis as stated earlier. Yet, they are also very different and allow for contrast. France has dominant linguistic-ethnic national identity, historical state religion, a significant and conflicted history through orientalism, colonialism in North Africa and post-colonial immigration, whereas the US is a white settler former colony, with a history of slavery and an immigration society, where Muslims have been overshadowed by a history of more developed anti-Black and anti-Mexican, as well as wider anti-Hispanic, racisms. Yet, both have seen a rise in both anti-Muslim rhetoric, attacks and movements on the extremes and more worryingly, in the mainstream, including in democratic electoral politics.
Islamophobias: Definitions and debates
In 1997, the Runnymede Trust dedicated a report to the rise of Islamophobia in Britain which it defined as 'unfounded hostility towards Islam' (Runnymede Trust 1997, 1 Various surveys have shown in recent years that 'anti-Muslim biases' (Taras 2013, 426-431) have been prevalent across much of Europe (for a more thorough overview in France, see (Hajjat and Mohammed 2013, 37-68) and in Britain, see (Field 2007) or 'anti-Muslim racism, as hate and/or racism is more accurate than fear (or phobia) and it is directed against a people, rather than a religion. Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood (2009, 338) do not reject the term, but argue that Islamophobia needs to be seen in relation to/as a form of racism. Being Muslim is argued to be a belief system and thus a choice, a status one decides to take on willingly, as opposed to a set of characteristics imposed by birth like 'race'. For Raymond Taras (2013, 422) , 'Islamophobia can be characterized as a cryptic articulation of the concept of race and racism even if overtly it appears as a form of religious-based prejudice'. For Pnina Werbner (2013, 455) , Whatever the case, the effects of securitisation and the attacks on Islamic symbols are racist, in the sense that they license the actions and discourses of individuals and groups who promote more offensive racist imaginaries.
Sixteen years after its first report on the issue, it is thus unsurprising that, in the Runnymede Trust's 2013 report 'The New Muslims' ), Claire Alexander (2013 observes that 'as the "colour line" was for the early 20th century, "The Muslim Question" has become the defining issue of our times.' The forward to the report, Rob Berkeley (2013, 2) points out that since 1997 we have seen a shift in domestic and international policy from a focus on equality and justice to issues of security and cohesion, and from race and ethnicity to religion, largely, focused on Muslims.
Although the focus is on religion, the distinction between race and ethnicity and religion is not always clear, particularly when it comes to issues of inequalities, state policies and practise (e.g. securitization) and hate in the media and civil society. Alexander (2013, 6) notes that:
Since this period the race equality and religious equality agendas have become increasingly separate, and academic research in these areas has also become distinct… it is now seemingly possible to talk about religion without race and race without reference to religion. In the first instance, we risk separating out Muslims from a broader struggle for equality, and in the second we run the risk of subsuming or erasing the differences between experiences, priorities, groups and subjectivities for a one-size-fits-all definition of racism.
In Key to our framework is the understanding of Islamophobias as articulations rather than selfcontained categories. Our focus is thus on discourse, and is influenced by the post-structuralist theory and the so-called Essex school in particular (Laclau 2005, Laclau and Mouffe 1985) . Through the different modes of articulation outlined in the following section, the signifier 'Muslim' and 'Islam' are constructed in different manners, but ultimately, they represent an Other, often described along racist lines in the current hegemonic discourse in much of the west. Yet, we argue, it is only through the dual offer of what we define as illiberal and liberal and Islamophobias in this article that this racist discourse can become naturalized and common sense, since it allows for those espousing the liberal position to justify their racist discourse by opposing it to the illiberal articulation, even though both are part of the same exclusionary paradigm. While it remains conceptual, contingent and may be contested, the distinction we make between the illiberal and liberal articulations is present to accommodate different articulations and acknowledge the construction of an opposition by those espousing the liberal version for functional and strategic reasons: to displace racism and appear more mainstream. We acknowledge that this obscures their shared racist basis and eventual convergence, but argue that the discursive and functional distinction should be examined.
We thus see Islamophobia as a construct, and the Muslim signifier as one which does not come from the individual Muslim in a subjective manner, but is defined by the onlooker in a position of power and imposed onto people through various types of generalization, misperception and stigmatization, such as the so-called secular and anti-terrorist laws, but also through the media coverage of Islam (Liogier 2016 , Deltombe 2005 , Kundnani 2014 ). Such constructions can be articulated through different types of discourses, from the more traditional forms of biological racism in unreconstructed far-right and white supremacist circles, to more 'evolved' forms of racism based on culture and even progressive tropes. Political actors across the spectrum rarely limit themselves to one of these articulations, and yet their distinctiveness is key to legitimize, normalize and internalize certain forms of racism as they appear to stand in opposition to more reviled forms. It is precisely these articulations of hate which are central to this article, and how Islamophobia springs from different sources and discourses and serves different purposes, contexts and constituencies, from the illiberal, unacceptable and extreme racist hate to the more liberal, acceptable and mainstream, but ultimately intersects. As noted by Mattias Ekman (2015 Ekman ( , 1998 , 'Islamophobia is framed in relation to various national and transnational political actors and processes, and depending on the topic, events or circumstances, it intersects with various political rationales and processes'.
In the following sections, we construct a framework to account for what we consider the two most prominent articulations of current Islamophobic discourse to provide a more flexible and comprehensive way to delineate Islamophobias and thus address them and where they intersect more precisely. These are, as stated, illiberal Islamophobia and liberal Islamophobia. (Taguieff 1994 , Barker 1982 , has termed the 'new racism':
a racism which has as its dominant theme not the biological heredity, but the irreducibility of cultural differences; a racism which, at first sight, does not imply the superiority of certain groups or peoples over others, but 'only' the noxiousness of the removal of borders, the incompatibility of ways of life and traditions (Balibar 1997, 33 ).
This type of discourse remains very much on the margin of politics because of its illiberal quality, insofar as it advocates for different rights to different people and cultures, but it occupies a space between the most reviled forms of racism based on biology and its more insidious occurrences based on culture. This is enabled by several factors specific to Islam and Muslims, most notably the status of
Islam as a religion, returning to the previous discussion, as well as the legacy of colonial discourses in France and Britain, migration, and essentialized constructions of cultural difference. In terms of the latter, this can take the form of colonial cultural essentialism and hierarchies or a pseudo progressive anthropological one. This opens the door to liberal Islamophobia by concealing its racism behind 'culture'.
Obviously, as with other ideological elements, the borders between what is acceptable or not,
what is mainstream or extreme, are fuzzy and in constant evolution, which has been both useful and damaging for those parties and movements trying to walk the tightrope. In France for example, illiberal Islamophobia is mostly associated with the far-right, and the Front National (FN) in particular.
The party, founded by neo-fascists in the early 1970s, took a conscious turn in the 1980s as its radical and uncompromising strategy based on racist and proto-fascist politics was clearly failing (Mondon 2013) . With the arrival of a new generation of thinkers and expert politicians, the FN turned gradually to a strategy of normalization, which meant moving away from crude racist politics towards a 'new' racism based on culture. Under the impulse of the Nouvelle droite and Alain de Benoist's theories in particular (Taguieff 1994 , Bar-On 2013 , the FN implemented a form of right-wing Gramscism: cultural power must come before political power. Far-right measures and ideological tenets became hidden under a veneer of softer rhetoric; the concepts of invasion, conspiracy and violence remained omnipresent throughout the programme, but were camouflaged by apparently positive or at least non-threatening labels.
This discursive shift has accelerated under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, by moving away from its traditional racist past and discourse to a more hegemonic strategy aimed at securing the common understanding of key concepts such as the Republic and laïcité (secularism) (Alduy and Wahnich 2015, Crépon, Dézé, and Mayer 2015) . However, the FN's strategy has required an ideological stretch from the party as its quest to reach a broader electorate cannot take place at the expense of the more traditional and active section of supporters (Mondon 2014) . Therefore, despite its attempts at reshaping its discourse in a more liberal progressive form, the FN remains the symbol of illiberal Islamophobia, although not its crudest proponent. As such, it falls outside the remits of what is considered acceptable in the hegemonic discourse and apart from the most ideologicallyfocussed groups on the right, most have tried to distance themselves from such labels.
In the United States, illiberal racisms have not been limited to the far-right. The US provides an interesting supplement to the story in France as a fellow republic with a tension and contradiction between its liberal and egalitarian premise and reactionary, illiberal practices and state formations Although not technically on the far-right, the religious right, another bastion of illiberalism that was on the ascent during the Bush era (Martin 2005) and was associated in this area with the inflammatory Koran burning tactics of Pastor Terry Jones, was not initially focused on Islam.
Immediately following 9/11, Jerry Falwell, the founder of the Moral Majority, issued a statement that blamed liberals, feminists, 'gays' and 'lesbians', but not Muslims. Islamophobia to distance themselves from traditional racist politics. As Kundnani (2014, 238-239) noted, the EDL's first video plundered 'antifascist imagery in an attempt to construct a popular front against Islamic extremism … By claiming to attack Muslim extremism rather than Muslims per se, the EDL hoped to dispel the suspicion that it was just another fringe, racist, far-right group'. It did so by highlighting gender and setting up an LGBT division. While such attempts were thwarted by the obvious racist leanings of most of its propaganda, they demonstrated the increasingly blurry borders between the crudest form of Islamophobia and more accepted and even mainstream forms.
Therefore, the illiberal articulation of Islamophobia has two elements central to our argument.
The first is that it can be defined as a discourse falling outside of the liberal norm because of its calls for discriminatory practices based on culture, ethnicity and or/religion, but at the same time stirring and open discrimination, which make it possible for subtler forms of Islamophobia to enter the mainstream discourse due their apparent allegiance to liberal democratic rules.
From the illiberal to the liberal, slippage and distinction within Islamophobic discourse
While the most caricatural forms of illiberal Islamophobia are usually easily recognized and widely denounced in mainstream discourse, we argue that a more mainstream trend has taken hold of public discourse and become increasingly normalized. The liberal articulation of Islamophobia can be contrasted with the illiberal one by its proclaimed allegiance to fantasized liberal and democratic principles, but both share a basic structure. In both cases, hate and prejudice against Muslims focuses on culture, as in the case of colonial Orientalism, which current forms have inherited and can draw on (Said 2003 , Meer 2014 . The difference is that the illiberal form, finding its roots in traditionally racist movements, draws on the anti-Arab racism of earlier colonial and cold war discourses, and the liberal form takes its cultural understanding of racism a step further by explicitly distancing itself from, and even repudiating openly traditional racism and hate, by appearing to focus only on 'religion', 'culture' and/or values, and/in relation to rights and tolerance as values inherent to Western societies Therefore, contrary to illiberal and more extreme forms of Islamophobia, liberal Islamophobia is anchored in a pseudo-progressive narrative in the defence of the rule of law based on liberal equality, freedom and rights (e.g. liberal versions of freedom of speech, gender and sexual equality). A similar concept to that which is studied here, has been discussed by Deepa Kumar in
Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire. In it, Kumar differentiates the liberal form not from an illiberal one, but 'conservative Islamophobia'. She argues that the key characteristics of the liberal version are:
1. The rejection of the 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis; 2. The recognition of 'good' Muslims; and 3. A willingness to work with 'moderate Islamists' (Kumar 2012, 133) . She also adds that the liberal version is 'rhetorically gentler', but that it remains racist and imperialist as it 'takes for granted the "white man's burden" (Kumar 2012, 133 In our framework, and to take the argument beyond the US context, two aspects make the liberal articulation of Islamophobia distinct, not from conservative, but extreme and illiberal forms:
• It allows for limited distinctions between 'good' (redeemable) and 'bad' Muslims subject to a loyalty test, that is through (demands for) explicit expressions of opposition and apologies from 'moderate' Muslims, even though the line to satisfy such demands is arbitrary, and always moving out of reach.
• It emphasises the apparent inclusion of other ethnic and religious groups typically hated by the far-right and traditional racists. Such groups provide a veneer of tolerance and progressivism as their victimization is acknowledged, albeit diverted onto a particular scapegoat: the racialized and stigmatized group can join if 'They' decide to integrate through hate.
We argue that while this may be a characteristic of mainstream and thus liberal Islamophobia and serves to provide cover against accusations of racism, it is used by conservatives and even those usually associated with the more illiberal articulation as well, as demonstrated further. To gain legitimacy, it is thus crucial that liberal Islamophobia goes beyond its attacks on
Muslims, and appears to challenge traditional far-right and ultra-conservative discourses and ideologies. In its self-proclaimed yet limited opposition to the reviled 'racists', 'sexists' and 'fundamentalists' of all kinds, it enables far greater mainstream and even progressive acceptance. As has already been mentioned, freedom of speech, gender rights and secularism have been key elements to justify the mainstreaming of Islamophobia. To illustrate this trend, key themes were selected from our case studies.
Liberal Islamophobia and free speech
The Respect for minorities, including homosexuals. Equality for women (Maher 27 September 2014) .
This critique of liberals served to shame liberals and soften conservatives to the point where the space was created to allow for a broader based and more widespread acceptance of Islamophobia. The Yet, Maher has not been exactly liberal on gender issues, and associates such tolerance with femininity: 'For a lack of a better term I would say the feminine values are now the values of America, sensitivity is more important than truth, feelings are more important that facts' (Maher 2016) . As the feminization thesis indicates, he employs gender stereotypes as a matter of course and provocation.
In one case, he combined an attack on Muslims and sexism: 'Dealing with Hamas is like dealing with a crazy woman who's trying to kill you -you can only hold her wrists so long before you have to slap her' (Maher 2016 Islam a threat to women's rights and safety, but so too is feminism (Yiannopoulos 12 October 2016) .
It is also worth mentioning that Yiannopoulos has also attacked Islam and Muslims for homophobia, highlighting the fact that as a gay man he would be a target, but he criticized the gay community and liberals in general for failing to call out Muslims in the wake of the attack on The Pulse nightclub in
Orlando by Omar Mateen on 12 June 12 2016, and focusing instead on gun control (Yiannopoulos 15 June 2016),
Gay people need an end to gun free zones. Gay people need and end to the pointless pacifism of the left because we have a threat on our shores, in our communities, in our societies, in streets not far from here, that requires a response from the minorities the left has given up on. It refuses to protect us, instead it pits us against each other. It creates a victimhood hierarchy with Muslims at the top, well the problem with putting Muslims at the top is they want to kill everyone else on the list.
Returning to the issue of gender, Despite the focus on women's rights, however defined and constructed, it emerged that a US Airforce Research Laboratory report 'Countering Violent Extremism:
Scientific Methods and Strategies' claimed that the hijab, far from being oppressive, was a form of 'passive terrorism' (Buncombe 24 February 2016) ; Muslim women were no longer victims to be saved, but weapons.
Liberal Islamophobia and secularism
The religious argument and its place in secular western societies has been key to the Therefore, what we witness with the liberal articulation of Islamophobia is a double standard which betrays its racist basis. In the examples we provided from our case studies, the 'Muslim' becomes the ultimate threat to universalism. However, Muslims are not posited as the only threat as others' demands for equality and emancipation are also constructed as putting the current hegemony at risk. More than simply the racist construction of the Muslim, it is anything different from a very particular, limited and reactionary understanding of the liberal west which is placed under a state of suspicion and potential exclusion. As David Tyrer (2010, 102) points out, 'Islamophobia codes the Muslim other in terms of degrees of difference from the universal white male, rather than through the hard logic of pure alterity'.
Conclusion: Fuzzy borders and the mainstreaming of Islamophobia
The first part of the article discussed briefly some of the many debates currently taking place in academia with regard to Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate, demonstrating the very flexibility which has made it such a powerful tool. While there are many ways to demonstrate the potency of Islamophobia in our society, this article argues that the division between liberal and illiberal types can help us shed more light as to the ways in which it travels and has been mainstreamed in different political and cultural contexts However, this division does not mean that the concepts are exclusive.
In fact, they are linked by the target and at the borders.
As was argued in the article, the acceptance of liberal Islamophobia within the mainstream rests on that of illiberal Islamophobia being both easily identified, contrasted and denounced. Yet the mask slips easily and often, not only because there is a blurred or slippery relationship between the two concepts based on a shared antagonism, target and structure, but also because both are responses or backlashes to the impact of the liberal social movements of the 1960s-80s: feminism, anti-colonialism, LGBT rights and anti-racism despite liberals claiming to champion some of these.
Illiberal Islamophobia stands strongly against these and wants the clock turned back. While there was once a clear support in the mainstream elite discourse for these social movements, a counterhegemonic discourse has gained ground since the 1990s positing that the emancipation and equality of some beneficiaries of liberal rights and equality may pose a risk to western culture based around In response to the rise in illiberalism during the campaign, Salon's Jeffrey Tayler (Obeidallah 20 February 2017) . The French and American cases, for all their differences, testify to the fact that the boundary between illiberal and liberal islamophobia, like that between racism and religious hate, is not only blurry, slippery and porous, but opportunistic, with the common denominator being anti-Muslim hate.
